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Abstract  
Interacting to reach a shared decision is an omnipresent component of human collaboration. 
We explored the interaction between dyads of individuals with different levels of expertise. 
The members of the dyads completed a number line task privately, jointly and privately 
again. In the joint condition, dyad members shared their private estimates and then negotiated 
a joint estimate. Both dyad members averaged their private individual estimates to determine 
joint estimates, thereby showing a strong equality bias. Their performance in the joint 
FRQGLWLRQH[FHHGHGWKHSHUIRUPDQFHRIWKHG\DG¶VEHVWHVWLPDWRUGHPRQVWUDWLQJLQWHUDFWLRQ
benefit, only when the dyad members had similar levels of expertise and when the averaged 
dyad performance was sufficiently accurate. At the end of the task, participants rated their 
and their partner¶V level of competence. Participants were accurate in classifying themselves 
as the expert or the novice within the dyad. Nevertheless, novices tended to overestimate their 
ability as they admitted to being less competent but only slightly worse than their expert 
partner. Experts, instead, believed themselves to be more competent but were humble and 
considered their performance only marginally better than their partner. Overall, these results 
have important implications for settings in which people with different levels of expertise 
interact.  
 
Keywords: Decision making, Numerical cognition, Interactive minds, Expertise, Number line.   
Statement of the public significance: 
Interaction to reach a shared decision is an omnipresent component of human collaboration, 
and is presented in different scenarios from the classroom, to the workplace, and the army. 
Among pairs of individuals (dyads) with different levels of expertise, it is desired that 
novices will profit the most from collaborating with an expert. We showed that the two 
members of the dyad, regardless of their level of expertise, greatly adopted an averaging 
strategy assigning an equal weight to their estimates. Interaction was beneficial when the 
dyad members had similar levels of expertise and when, on their own, they were sufficiently 
accurate. Moreover, novices tended to overestimate their ability as they admitted to being less 
competent but only slightly worse than their partner. Experts, instead, believed themselves to 
be more competent but were humble and considered their performance only marginally better 
than their novice partner. 
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Introduction 
Many group decisions are made by counting the number of votes in favour of each 
available option ± with the option favoured by most votes being the winner. Under this rule, 
HDFKYRWHFDUULHVWKHVDPHZHLJKWUHJDUGOHVVRIWKHYRWHU¶VH[SHUWLVH+RZHYHULQHYHU\GD\
OLIHZHRIWHQZHLJKWWKHRSLQLRQVRIRWKHUV¶DFFRUGLQJWRWKHLUHVWLPDWHGOHYHORIH[SHUWLVH
Weighting opinions appropriately is especially important when individuals with different 
levels of expertise are brought together to reach a group decision (Grofman, Owen, & Feld, 
1983). This situation arises in many learning and educational contexts, such as school 
classrooms where students with different abilities are brought together to work on a common 
project. Here, we tested how individuals with different levels of expertise combine 
(continuous) estimates into a joint estimate in the context of a numerical task and tested 
whether the benefit of interaction differs for novices and experts. 
Research on judgement and decision-making has shown that (simple) averaging (or 
the median) of continuous estimates obtained from different individuals can improve 
accuracy in a range of domains ± often over and above the single-best individual estimate 
(Armstrong, 2001; Clemen, 1989; Galton, 1907; Jacobson, DobbsǦMarsh, Liberman, & 
Minson, 2011; Minson, Liberman, & Ross, 2011). As a rule-of-thumb, averaging unbiased 
but noisy estimates causes uncorrelated errors to cancel out (Bruce, 1935; Eysenck, 1939; 
Galton, 1907; Gordon, 1924, 1935; Preston, 1938; Smith, 1931). Averaging, however, only 
works well when the individual estimates are equally likely to fall on either side of the truth ± 
DSULQFLSOHNQRZQDVWKHµEUDFNHWLQJSULQFLSOH¶:KHQWKHLQGLYLGXDOHVWLPDWHVDUHELDVHG
towards the same side of the truth (overestimation or underestimation by both dyad 
members), the average estimate is, at best, as accurate as the single-best individual estimate 
(Jacobson et al., 2011; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Minson et al., 2011; Soll & Larrick, 2009).  
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Averaging can be beneficial not only for groups but also for single individuals. For 
example, the average of two estimates from the same participant tend to be more accurate 
than either estimate (Vul & Pashler, 2008). This within-individual benefit may arise when the 
WZRHVWLPDWHVDUHµLQFRUUHFW¶LQGLIIHUHQWZD\V± for example, because the estimates are based 
on different sources of knowledge (Herzog & Hertwig, 2009). This µGLDOHFWDOERRWVWUDSSLQJ¶ 
can be induced by asking people for a second opinion after considering the opposite stance 
(Lord, Lepper, & Preston, 1984) or reasoning why their initial estimate might be incorrect 
(Hoch, 1985). Individuals may also spontaneously engage in dialectal bootstrapping after 
having had experience with combining the estimates of others with their own. For example, 
Liberman et al. (2012) found that, after dyad members had interacted about joint estimates, 
subsequent individual estimates reached a high level of accuracy ± a result which does not 
depend on feedback (Minson et al., 2011) or task expertise (Jacobson et al., 2011). The 
question remains, however, whether interacting individuals would use weighted averaging to 
combine continuous estimates in the face of differences in expertise.  
A recent set of studies, using visual psychophysics, have shown that dyad members 
only obtain a true interaction benefit ± that is, when joint decisions are more accurate than 
those of the best dyad members ± when they have similar levels of expertise (Bahrami, 
Didino, Frith, Butterworth, & Rees, 2013; Bahrami et al., 2012a, 2012b; Bahrami et al., 2010; 
Bang et al., 2014; Mahmoodi, Bang, Ahmadabadi, & Bahrami, 2013). This pattern of 
responses is thought to arise because dyad members assign equal weights to their opinions 
(akin to simple averaging), even when they are explicitly informed about their differences in 
expertise or offered monetary incentives to maximise their joint accuracy (Mahmoodi et al., 
2015). 7KLV³HTXDOLW\ELDV´ might be of a social nature; for example, the ³novice´PD\LQVLVW
RQSOD\LQJDUROHRUWKH³H[SHUW´PD\IHHOREOLJHGWRtreat the novice as an equal (Harvey & 
Fischer, 1997; Mahmoodi et al., 2015). It might also arise because people often are bad at 
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identifying the relative expertise of  different group members (Henry, 1995; Miner, 1984; 
Trotman, Yetton, & Zimmer, 1983); for example, expertise is often judged from cues such as 
confidence and tendency to talk (Littlepage, Robison, & Reddington, 1997), which correlate 
poorly with expertise in some domains (Klayman, Soll, González-Vallejo, & Barlas, 1999).  
Here we sought to bring together, on one hand, the research on estimation strategies 
and, on the other hand, research on the effect of differences in expertise on joint accuracy. To 
induce differences in expertise, participants with backgrounds in either maths or humanities 
(combination of participants: Maths-Maths, Maths-Humanities, and Humanities-Humanities) 
estimated the location of different numbers on a number line privately, together and privately 
again. Within each dyad, we classified participants as expert or novice based on their 
performance on the number line task (Sella, Sader, Lolliot, & Cohen Kadosh, 2016; Siegler & 
Opfer, 2003). 
First, we asked how the benefit of joint performance varied with individual expertise. 
We would expect the joint responses to be more accurate than the pre-interaction estimates 
made by novices, whereas we would expect such an improvement to be smaller for experts 
(Minson et al., 2011). Nevertheless, the dyadic interaction might bring a benefit (i.e., joint 
decisions might be more accurate than those of the best dyad member) when the two 
members of the dyads have similar levels of expertise (Bahrami et al., 2013; Mahmoodi et al., 
2013). Second, we asked whether novices were more swayed by the experts ± or whether the 
use of a simple averaging strategy would prevail. Lastly, we asked how any post-interaction 
benefit varied with individual expertise. We would expect WKDWQRYLFH¶VSRVW-interaction 
performance is higher than their pre-interaction performance, whereas such an improvement 
would be limited or possibly absent for experts (Liberman et al., 2012). For example, novices 
might recognise their poor performance in comparison with experts and then adjust their 
mapping strategy when performing the number line task in the post-interaction condition. 
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Method 
Participants 
Sixty university students (26 males; Mage=20.68, SD=2.45) from the faculties of maths 
and humanities took part in the present study. The sample size was doubled compared to a 
previous study exploring individuals' interaction in the numerical domain (Bahrami et al., 
2013; Experiment 1). The maths (n=31) and humanities (n=29) students were assigned to a 
dyad according to their availability, resulting in 8 maths-maths, 7 humanities-humanities and 
15 maths-humanities dyads. Participants did not know each other in advance and were 
compensated for their time (approximately 1 hour 20 minutes) with £5 and entry into a lottery 
to win £100. The study was approved by the Medical Sciences Inter Divisional Research 
Ethics Committee at University of Oxford. 
Tasks 
The Number line task (Sella, Sader, Lolliot, & Cohen Kadosh, 2016; Siegler & Opfer, 
2003). This task required participants to locate a target number on a visual horizontal line, 
where only the extremes of the line were labelled. The number line task was originally 
implemented by Siegler and Opfer (2003) to investigate numerical estimation in children and 
adults. It has been repeatedly found that the pattern of estimates shifts from a biased (log-
like) to an accurate (linear) mapping when children increase their numerical knowledge and 
experience with the proposed numerical intervals (Siegler & Booth, 2004). For instance, 
second graders display an accurate mapping when placing numbers in the interval 0-100 but 
still display a biased mapping with the interval 0-1000. The biased pattern was originally 
thought to resemble the logarithmic compression of the mental number line (Dehaene, 2003). 
However, several alternative theoretical accounts have been proposed to explain the shift 
from biased to linear mapping (Barth & Paladino, 2011; Cohen & Sarnecka, 2014; Hurst, 
Leigh Monahan, Heller, & Cordes, 2014; Moeller, Pixner, Kaufmann, & Nuerk, 2009). In 
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particular, it has been suggested that the performance in the number line task can be 
interpreted as a proportional judgment (Barth & Paladino, 2011). Accordingly, adults seem to 
implement a proportional estimation strategy, which usually leads to high level of accuracy 
(Cohen & Blanc-Goldhammer, 2011; Sullivan, Juhasz, Slattery, & Barth, 2011), even though 
individual differences can emerge. For instance, mathematicians outperformed non-
mathematicians when mapping positive numbers on the line, albeit this relation is fully 
explained by visuospatial skills (Sella et al., 2016). Similarly, those with better mental 
rotation abilities are able to perform more accurately on the number line task (Thompson, 
Nuerk, Moeller, & Cohen Kadosh, 2013). Overall, the task requires knowledge of the 
symbolic numerical system, the representation of symbolic numerical quantities, strategies to 
map numbers onto space and visuospatial skills (Sella et al., 2016; Sullivan et al., 2011). 
Each trial began with the presentation of an unmarked number line extending from -
1000 to +1000, with the same target number displayed above both extreme ends (Figure 1). 
On each LCD monitor, the white number line was presented on a black background across 
1000 pixels; each key press moved the slider by one pixel, which corresponded to two 
numerical magnitudes on the number line. The monitors were identical, widescreen (51cm x 
32cm) and had a spatial resolution of 1920 x 1200 pixels. We created the task in Matlab, 
using the Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner et al., 2007; Pelli, 
1997). 
The task was composed of four sequential conditions: pre-interaction, to-be-shared, 
joint and post-interaction (Figure 1). Forty-eight different target numbers were presented for 
each condition, except for the to-be-shared and joint conditions in which the same target 
numbers were displayed. To avoid a repetition effect, different target numbers were presented 
in the pre-interaction, to-be-shared, and post-interaction conditions. In each condition, half of 
the target numbers were positive and half were negative, though the same absolute values 
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were used for both halves. None of the numbers were divisible by five and none fell within 
100 digits of the endpoints (-1000 and +1000). Numbers that met these criteria were selected 
pseudorandomly and presented in a pseudorandom order. The magnitude of target numbers 
was similar across conditions (Pre-interaction: M=470, SD=257; To-be-shared: M=408, 
SD=228; Post-interaction: M=390, SD=205). Every participant was presented with the same 
numbers in the same order. Two practice trials were presented at the beginning of each 
condition. 
In the pre-interaction condition (Figure 1a), participants privately estimated the 
location of the target numbers on the line by pressing the left and right arrow keys to move 
their slider to the desired position. All sliders were initially presented at the extreme left or 
right of the number line on negative and positive target trials respectively.  
----------------------------- Please insert Figure 1 here --------------------------- 
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Figure 1. Diagram of the number line task. a) An example of a number line task trial in the 
pre-interaction condition: The novice and expert completed 48 trials without interacting. b) 
An example of the to-be-shared and joint conditions: in the to-be-shared trial, the novice and 
expert privately estimated the position of a target number (in white boxes) on the line; 
thereafter, in the joint trial, participants could see their estimates from the previous trial (i.e., 
a to-be-shared one), distinguished by red and blue colours on the same number line. Then, the 
two members of the dyad alternately adjusted the slider to reach a shared joint estimate. c) An 
example of a trial in the post-interaction condition: novice and expert completed 48 trials 
without interacting. d) The configuration of monitors and participants in the testing room. 
 
Upon completion, participants SUHVVHGWKHµ1H[W¶NH\ (i.e., the ³E´ key for the red 
participant and the ³up arrow´ key for the blue participant; the keys were labelled ³1H[W´
Who Gains More: Experts or Novices? 10 
 
with stickers), received no feedback and waited for their partner to finish before progressing 
onto the next trial. In order that individuals did not recognise whether they were the slower or 
faster member of the dyad, participants were informed that they were waiting for the 
computer to load the next number line. A random delay (varying between 1 and 3 seconds) 
ZDVLQVHUWHGEHWZHHQWKHSRLQWDWZKLFKWKHVORZHVWG\DGPHPEHUSUHVVHGµ1H[W¶DQGRQVHW
of the next trial. 
In the to-be-shared condition (Figure 1b), the nature of the task was identical to the 
pre-interaction condition except participants were aware that the next trial was a joint one. In 
the joint condition, both dyad members were simultaneously shown the locations of their own 
and their SDUWQHU¶VHVWLPDWHVIURPWKHSUHYLRXVWULDOi.e., a to-be-shared one), distinguished 
by different colours on the same number line (i.e., blue and yellow, even though in the figures 
we used red and blue to increase discriminability). One of the dyad members (A from hereon) 
was handed control of a joint slider, which was also presented on the same number line. It 
was alternated across trials whether dyad member A or B was handed first control of the joint 
slider. Participant A was encouraged to discuss the desired location of the joint response, 
PRYHWKHVOLGHUWRWKLVORFDWLRQDQGWKHQSUHVVµ1H[W¶DIWHUZKLFKFRQWURORIthe joint slider 
ZDVKDQGHGWRSDUWLFLSDQW%3DUWLFLSDQW%HLWKHUDGMXVWHGWKHMRLQWVOLGHU¶VORFDWLRQLQWKH
FDVHRIGLVDJUHHPHQWRUQRWLQWKHFDVHRIDJUHHPHQWDQGWKHQSUHVVHGµ1H[W¶WRKDQG
control back to participant A. This turn-taking process continued until both the participants 
stopped readjusting WKHVOLGHUEHIRUHSUHVVLQJµ1H[W¶7KHHQWLUHSURFHVVZDVGLVSOD\HGWR
both dyad members on each of their monitors simultaneously.  
Finally, participants completed the post-interaction condition (Figure 1c) in which the 
nature of the task was identical to the pre-interaction condition, except that participants were 
aware that this was the last phase of the task. For each estimate, we calculated the absolute 
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deviation (see formula below) as a measure of error, as was done in previous studies (Sella et 
al., 2016). ܾܽݏ݋݈ݑݐ݁݀݁ݒ݅ܽݐ݅݋݊ ൌ ȁ݁ݏݐ݅݉ܽݐ݁ െ ݐܽݎ݃݁ݐ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎȁ 
Competence scale. PDUWLFLSDQWVHVWLPDWHGWKHLUVDQGWKHLUSDUWQHU¶VFRPSHWHQFHin the 
computational estimation task and in the number line task separately by writing down a 
whole number between 1 and 100, where 1 indicates that estimates were extremely 
inaccurate/very far from the true answer and 100 indicates that estimates were extremely 
accurate/very close to the true answer. One dyad did not complete the competence scale then 
the following analysis is limited to 29 dyads. 
 
Procedure 
Participants reported their field of study, together with demographic information (age, 
gender, university, degree type, year of study, nationality and ethnicity), on the questionnaire 
provided. Participants were informed of whether their dyadic partner was studying maths or 
one of the humanities. Throughout the study, participants sat in the same room at right angles 
to one another, each with their own keyboard and monitor (Figure 1d). After completing the 
demographic questionnaire, participants completed the first ten trials of a computational 
estimation task and then the conditions (pre-interaction, to-be-shared, joint, and post-
interaction) of the number line task. At the end of the number line task, participants 
responded to the remaining ten trials of the computational estimation task. Finally, 
participants estimated theirs and their SDUWQHU¶VFRPSHWHQFHLQWKH computational estimation 
task and in the number line task using the competence scale. The results from the 
computational estimation task are reported in the supplementary materials. Specifically, the 
pattern of results (see below) remained stable when we categorised participants in expert and 
novices using the performance in the computational estimation task (see supplementary 
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materials). The data can be found at 
https://osf.io/wnzhm/?view_only=f92fa71c4a88452fb32388b92c6b94f6. 
 
Results 
Statistical analyses were conducted using the free software JASP (JASP Team, 2017) 
using default priors and R (R Core Team, 2014) along with the package ggplot2 for graphs 
(Wickham, 2009). We ran Bayesian analyses and reported Bayes factors (BF10) expressing 
the probability of the data given H1 relative to H0 (i.e., values larger than 1 are in favour of 
H1 whereas values smaller than 1 are in favour of H0). In case of model comparison, we 
computed the BF as the ratio between the BF10 of the first model and the BF10 of the second 
model (i.e., values larger than 1 are in favour of the first model whereas values smaller than 1 
are in favour of the second model). We described the evidence associated with BFs as 
³DQHFGRWDO´ (1/3 < BF < 3)³PRGHUDWH´ (BF < 1/3 or BF > 3)³VWURQJ´ (BF < 1/10 or BF > 
10)³YHU\VWURQJ´ (BF < 1/30 or BF > 30)DQG³H[WUHPH´ (BF < 1/100 or BF > 100) 
(Jeffreys, 1961). Results from NHST approach and associated p-values can be found in the 
supplementary materials.  
Participants 
 There was anecdotal evidence for a difference in age and the odds of being 
British/other nationality, Caucasian/other ethnicity or an undergraduate/postgraduate between 
maths and humanities students or between (see below) experts and novices (all BFs10 
between 0.31 and 2.19). There was strong evidence for higher odds of being male for maths 
students than for humanities students, BF10 = 20. However, there was anecdotal evidence for 
a difference in the odds of being male between experts and novices, BF10 = 0.36. 
 
Number line task 
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For each participant in each task condition, we calculated the mean absolute deviation 
and removed those trials below and above three standard deviations (percentages of trials 
removed: 1% in the pre-interaction condition, 0.76% in the to-be-shared condition, 0.35% in 
the Joint condition, 0.97% in post-interaction condition).  
We classified participants as experts and novices based on their performance in to-be-
shared condition of the number line task because this condition represents the estimates that 
participants were about to share with their partner, thereby determining the actual level of 
expertise within the dyad. Hence, the more accurate performer within each dyad was labelled 
the expert (n=30) and the less accurate member was labelled the novice (n=30).  
In the joint condition, experts and novices evaluated their estimates from the to-be-
shared trial and then negotiated a joint estimate. Consequently, both experts and novices 
obtained the same absolute deviations in the joint condition. Nevertheless, to be thorough, we 
analysed the absolute deviation (log base-10 transformed) in a Bayesian mixed ANOVA with 
Condition [pre-interaction, to-be-shared, joint, post-interaction] as a within-subjects factor 
and Expertise [Expert, Novice] and Dyad type [Maths-Maths, Maths-Humanities, 
Humanities-Humanities] as the between-subjects factors. The inclusion of Dyad type into the 
model led to an inclusion Bayes factor of 0.095 (this BF is obtained from averaging BFs from 
all the models including a specific effect, compared to all models that do not include the 
effect), therefore the Dyad type was removed from the model. There was extreme evidence in 
favour of the model including the interaction Condition x Expertise compared to the model 
with the two main effects (BF>100). We compared H[SHUWV¶DQGQRYLFHV¶absolute deviations 
in the pre-interaction, to-be-shared, and post-interaction conditions as well as observing 
within each group whether there were relevant differences between pre-interaction and to-be-
shared, to-be-shared and joint, joint and post-interaction, and pre-interaction and post-
interaction conditions using Bayesian t-tests (Figure 2). The experts displayed less absolute 
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deviation in the pre-interaction (Experts: M=1.65, SD=0.13; Novices: M=1.81, SD=0.12; 
BF10>100, extreme evidence) and post-interaction conditions compared to novices (Experts: 
M=1.57, SD=0.12; Novices: M=1.74, SD=0.16; BF10>100, extreme evidence). Both groups 
displayed a reduction in absolute error from the pre-interaction to the to-be-shared conditions 
(Experts: BF10=72, very strong evidence; Novices: BF10>100, extreme evidence). Only 
novices displayed a reduced absolute deviation in the joint condition compared to the to-be-
shared condition (Joint condition, M=1.55, SD=0.12; Novices: BF10>100, extreme evidence) 
ZKHUHDVH[SHUWV¶DEVROXWHGHYLDWLRQUHPDLQHGVWDEOHExperts: BF10=0.21, moderate 
evidence). Novices also showed an increase in absolute deviation in the post-interaction 
condition compared to the joint condition (Novices: BF10>100, extreme evidence) whereas 
H[SHUWV¶SHUIRUPDQFHDSSHDUHGWRUHPDLQVWDEOHExperts: BF10=0.25; moderate evidence). 
Finally, only experts displayed a strong reduction in absolute deviation in the post-interaction 
condition compared to the pre-interaction condition (Experts: BF10=24, strong evidence) 
whereas this difference appeared to be modest for Novices (Novices: BF10=4.77; moderate 
evidence). A detailed comparison of experts¶ DQGQRYLFHV¶VSDWLDOPDSSLQJcan be found in 
the supplementary materials. 
 
----------------------------- Please insert Figure 2 here --------------------------- 
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Figure 2. Mean absolute deviation (log10 transformed) in the number line task for each 
condition separately for experts (blue dots) and novices (red dots; error bars represent 
95%CIs). 
 
Joint strategy 
In the following analyses, we aimed to individuate whether experts or novices led the 
positioning of the joint estimates on the line. Additionally, we investigated the distribution of 
joint estimates in order to assess the presence of averaging.  
,QWKHMRLQWFRQGLWLRQHDFKPHPEHURIWKHG\DGVDZWKHRWKHU¶VPHPEHUHVWimate 
from the to-be-shared trial and then both members negotiated a joint estimate. We removed 
from the analysis eleven trials, in which the expert and novice provided exactly the same 
estimate in the to-be-shared condition and therefore no negotiation was required to obtain 
their joint response. For each joint trial, we defined the decision maker (i.e. the main 
contributor) as the participant who moved the slider more (as measured in pixels). In 14% of 
trials, each member of the dyad moved the slider the same number of pixels along the line, so 
WKHLUFRQWULEXWLRQZDVHTXDOLH³HTXDOFRQWULEXWLRQ´LQWKHVDPHWULDO7KHH[SHUWVPRYHG
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the mouse cursor more pixels compared to the novices in 43% of trials, whereas in the 
remaining 43% of trials the novices moved the mouse cursor more pixels. Therefore, the two 
members of the dyad contributed equally to the joint estimates across trials.  
Figure 3 shows the percentage of estimates in the joint condition as a function of the 
proportional distance between the QRYLFH¶V[ DQGWKHH[SHUW¶V[ HVWLPDWHVLQWKHWR-
be-shared condition. For instance, consider a trial in which the target number is 100 and the 
novice places the cursor on 50 whereas the expert places the cursor on 120. Then, in the joint 
condition, the two members of the dyad agree in placing the cursor on 80. The distance 
between the two estimates is 70 (i.e., 120-50), the distance between the joint estimate and the 
QRYLFH¶VHVWLPDWHLV (i.e., 80-50) and the distance between the joint estimate and the 
H[SHUW¶VHVWLPDWHLV (i.e., 120-80). Similarly, the distance between the correct position and 
WKHQRYLFH¶VHVWLPDWHLV (i.e., 100-50) whereas the distance between correct position and 
WKHH[SHUW¶VHVWLPDWHZDV (i.e., 120-100). Then, we seWWKHQRYLFH¶VHVWLPDWHWREHDQG
WKHH[SHUW¶VHVWLPDWHWREHWKHUHIRUHWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZRHVWLPDWHVZKLFKLVLV
QRZVHWWR7KHUHDIWHUWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHQRYLFH¶VHVWLPDWHDQGWKHMRLQWHVWLPDWHLV
rescaled to 0LHZKHUHDVWKHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHH[SHUW¶VHVWLPDWHDQGWKHMRLQ
estimate is the reciprocal, 07KHGLVWDQFHEHWZHHQWKHFRUUHFWSRVLWLRQDQGWKHQRYLFH¶V
estimated is rescaled to 0.71 (i.e., 50/70). Consequently, when the value on the x-axis is zero 
or one, the estimate in the joint condition equalled WKHQRYLFH¶VRUH[SHUW¶VHVWLPDWHLQWKHWR-
be-shared condition, respectively. It was found that 98% of the joint estimates fell within the 
LQWHUYDOFUHDWHGE\WKHWZRPHPEHUV¶HVWLPDWHVfrom the to-be-shared condition. Specifically, 
PRVWRIWKHMRLQWHVWLPDWHVZHUHSODFHGKDOIZD\EHWZHHQPHPEHUV¶HVWLPDWHVRURQRQHRIWKH
PHPEHU¶VHVWLPDWH7KHMRLQWHVWLPDWHVZHUHUDUHO\RIWULDOVSODFHGRXWVLGHWKHREWDLQHG
interval, either on the QRYLFH¶VRUH[SHUW¶VVLGHHYHQWKRXJKWKHWDUJHWSRVLWLRQZDVRXWVLGH
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the interval in 60% of the trials. Notably, experts and novices were both responsible for 
averaging in the joint condition.  
----------------------------- Please insert Figure 3 here --------------------------- 
 
 
Figure 3. The percentage of trials in the joint condition that were placed within and 
RXWVLGHWKHQXPHULFDOLQWHUYDOFUHDWHGE\WKHQRYLFH¶V[ DQGH[SHUW¶V[ HVWLPDWHV
in the to-be-shared condition, subdivided by the trials in which the expert or the novice 
mainly contributed to the joint estimate. The classification of novices and experts was 
based on their performance in the to-be-shared condition of the number line task. In 14% of 
trials, the two members of the dyad moved the slider the same number of pixels along the 
line, so their contribution was equal (green dots and line). In the remaining 86% of trials, 
experts (blue dots and line) contributed most to half of the joint estimates and novices 
contributed most to the other half (red dots and line).The pattern of results indicates that both 
expert and novice displayed a largely overlapping mapping strategy with strong use of 
averaging. The orange triangles represent the target position with respect to the interval 
creDWHGE\WKHH[SHUW¶VDQGQRYLFH¶VHVWLPDWHLQWKHWR-be-shared condition. In 40% of trials of 
WKHMRLQWFRQGLWLRQWKHSRVLWLRQRIWKHWDUJHWIHOOZLWKLQWKHLQWHUYDOFUHDWHGE\WKHQRYLFH¶V
DQGH[SHUW¶VHVWLPDWHVLQWKHWR-be-shared trial. In 98% of trials of the joint condition, experts 
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and novices decided to place the joint estimate within the interval they created in the to-be-
shared trial. 
 
Interaction benefit 
Here we analysed whether the dyad interaction led to a benefit and whether such a 
benefit could be explained by similarity in performance between the two members of the 
dyad and their average performance as dyad.  
For each dyad, we calculated the interaction index as the ratio between the G\DG¶V
absolute deviation in the joint condition and the dyad¶V EHVWHVWLPDWRU¶V%( absolute 
deviation calculated on all the trials of the to-be-shared condition. With a ratio larger than 
one, the joint performance of the dyad was worse than the performance of the BE in the dyad, 
indicating that the interaction led to a loss in performance. Conversely, with a ratio lower 
than one, the G\DG¶Vperformance exceeded that of the BE in the dyad, indicating that the 
interaction led to a benefit in performance. The mean obtained interaction index was 1 
(SD=0.19), indicating that the performance of the dyad in the joint condition tended to match 
the performance of the G\DG¶VBE in the to-be-shared condition and did not vary as a function 
of the dyad type (BF10=0.28, moderate evidence). In line with previous literature (Bahrami et 
al., 2010), we investigated whether the interaction benefit index varied as a function of the 
similarity in performance of the two dyad members in the to-be-shared condition. The 
VLPLODULW\LQGH[ZDVFDOFXODWHGDVWKHUDWLRRIWKHZRUVWWRWKHEHVWHVWLPDWRUV¶]-scored) 
absolute deviation, with higher values indicating higher differences in individual 
performance. We also investigated whether the mean absolute deviation (z-scored) of the two 
members of the dyad in the to-be-shared condition explained any variance in the interaction 
index or may change depending on similarity. It is possible that the effect on similarity on the 
interaction benefit may change depending on the average ability of the dyad, although we 
acknowledge the exploratory nature of this analysis. We ran a regression analysis with the 
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interaction index as the dependent variable and similarity in performance and average 
performance as the predictors (Table 1; Model 1). We found extreme evidence for the model 
including the interaction term compared to the model including only the two main effects 
(BF>100; Model 2). 
----------------------------- Please insert Table 1 here --------------------------- 
Model Measures B 95% CIs Model comparison ǻ5² BFm1/m2 
1 Average of performance 0.03 [-0.03 0.08] 1vsNull .56 >100 
 Similarity in performance 0.125 [0.07 0.18] 
  
 
2 Average of performance 0.04 [0.0002 0.085] 2vs1 .18 >100 
 Similarity in performance 0.15 [0.11 0.20] 
  
 
 Average x Similarity -0.07 [-0.11 -0.04] 
  
 
Table 1. Regression analyses with the interaction index as the outcome variable. For 
each dyad, tKHLQWHUDFWLRQLQGH[ZDVFDOFXODWHGDVWKHUDWLREHWZHHQWKHG\DG¶Vabsolute 
deviation and the dyad¶V EHVWHVWLPDWRU¶V%(absolute deviation. For both regression 
models: Multicollinearity was absent (i.e., all Variance Inflation Factors lower than 4); No 
outliers were identified (i.e., %RQIHUURQL¶VWHVWVRQ6WXGHQWL]HGUHVLGXDOVZHUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWK
ps>.05) and no influential observations were found (i.HDOO&RRN¶VGLVWDQFHVZHUHEHORZRU
equal 1); Normal distribution of residuals was respected (i.e., Shapiro tests were associated 
with ps>.05).  
 
 
 
From the visual inspection of the Figure 4, it emerged that for dyads with a 
sufficiently accurate mean performance in the to-be-shared condition, an interaction benefit 
emerged if the two dyad members displayed similar performance in the to-be-shared 
condition (for further exploration of this interaction see the supplementary materials).   
----------------------------- Please insert Figure 4 here --------------------------- 
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Figure 4. Predicted values (the hue outside the dots obtained with linear interpolation) 
from the regression analysis on interaction index as a function of the statistical 
interaction between similarity between the G\DG¶VPHPEHUVDQGWKHG\DG¶VDYHUDJH
performance. 7KHFLUFOHVUHSUHVHQWWKHDFWXDOG\DG¶VVFRUHVIRUVLPLODULW\DQGDYHUDJH
performance (z-scored), with the colour inside the circles representing the G\DG¶VDFWXDO
interaction index. As the average performance of the dyad decreased, the relationship 
between similarity and the interaction index progressively disappeared.  
 
 
 
 
 
Real and perceived competence 
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Both members rated their and their partner ability in mapping numbers on the 
competence scale. Therefore, for each participant, we could derive measures of real 
competence and perceived competence with respect to their partner. For real competence, we 
computed the logarithm1 of the ratio between thHSDUWQHU¶VDEVROXWHGHYLDWLRQDQGWKHVHOI-
absolute deviation in the to-be-shared condition (i.e., ratio of real competence), whereby 
positive values represent a better performance of the participant compared to her partner and 
negative values represent a worse performance compared to her partner. For perceived 
competence, we computed the logarithm of the ratio between the self-perceived competence 
DQGWKHSDUWQHU¶VSHUFHLYHGFRPSHWHQFHLHUDWLRRISHUFHLYHGFRPSHWHQFHZKHUHE\
positive values represent a participant considering her more accurate than her partner and 
negative values represent a participant considering her less accurate than her partner. A ratio 
of perceived competence of zero means that a participant considered herself having the same 
competence of her partner. In Figure 5, we plotted the relation between the real and perceived 
competences. Points landing in the upper right quadrant and in the bottom left quadrant are 
correct identifications whereas points in the other quadrants are wrong identifications. Only 
17% of the participants (8 novices and 2 experts) wrongly classified themselves as the novice 
or the expert in the dyad. Therefore, participants appeared to be aware about their level of 
competence in the task. It is interesting to notice that the distribution of ratios of perceived 
competence is narrow and to some extent skewed toward positive values. Individuals 
considered themselves to be marginally better or worse than their partners with a tendency to 
grant themselves a better ability in placing numbers on the line.  
                                                   
1
 We log transformed the ratios to overcome asymmetry. For example, a member of the dyad rated her 
FRPSHWHQFHWREHDQGKHUSDUWQHU¶VWREH\LHOGLQJDUDWLRRILH7KHRWKHUPHPEHURIWKH
dyad rated her competence to be 80 and her paUWQHU¶VWREH\LHOGLQJDUDWLRRILH,QWKLVVSHFLILF
case, the perceived levels of competence are symmetrical: one participant considered her competence to be half 
compared to the partner and the other participant considered her competence to be double compared to the 
SDUWQHU¶V7KLVV\PPHWU\LVQRWSURSHUO\DVVHVVHGE\UDWLRVLHFRPSDULQJDQGEXWLWLVSUHVHUYHGZLWK
the log transformation, whereby ln(0.5)=-0.69 and ln(2)=0.69. The logged ratios have the same magnitude but 
different sign.   
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----------------------------- Please insert Figure 5 here --------------------------- 
 
  
Figure 5. Relation between ratios of real and perceived competence for novices (red 
dots) and experts (blue dots). Grey lines connecting dots represent individuals from the 
same dyad. The grey bands at the bottom margin of the plot denote the distribution of ratio of 
perceived competence whereas grey bands on the right margin of the plot denote the 
distribution of ratio of real competence. The oblique grey line defines the perfect 
correspondence between real and perceived competence. 
 
Furthermore, there seems to be a discrepancy between the real and perceived 
competence as represented by the points on the plot being far away from the oblique grey 
line, which represents a perfect correspondence between the real and perceived competence. 
We calculated for each participant the difference between the ratio of perceived competence 
and the ratio of real competence: a positive value indicates that a participant overestimated 
her actual ability compared to her partner whereas a negative value indicates an 
underestimation of competence. Interestingly, there was extreme evidence for a difference 
between novices and experts: Novices overestimated their competence whereas experts 
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underestimated their competence (Novices: M=0.31, SD=0.31; Experts: M=-0.3, SD=0.3; 
BF10>100). Overall, novices realised to be the novice in the dyad but they tended to 
overestimate their competence as they admitted to be less competent but only slightly worse 
than their partner. Experts, instead, realised to be more competent but were humble and 
considered their performance to be only slightly better than their novice partner.    
----------------------------- Please insert Figure 6 here --------------------------- 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Difference between ratios of perceived and real competence. Positive values 
denote that participants overestimated their real ability compared to their partner whereas 
negative values denote an underestimation of competence. 
 
 
Discussion 
In the present study, young adults with an academic background in mathematics and 
the humanities were assigned to balanced dyads to complete the number line task privately, 
privately but knowing that they were about to share their estimates (i.e., the to-be-shared 
condition), jointly, and privately again. Afterwards, participants rated their and their partner¶V 
ability in mapping numbers on a numerical scale.  
First, within each dyad, participants were categorized as an expert or novice based on 
their performance in the to-be-shared condition of the number line task. Not surprisingly, 
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experts outperformed novices also in the pre-interaction condition. Both experts and novices 
mapped numbers more accurately in the to-be-shared condition compared to the pre-
interaction condition. This improvement in the to-be-shared condition could be attributed to a 
Hawthorne-like effect (Landsberger, 1958) given that participants knew that their estimates 
would be shared with the other member of the dyad. When members of the dyad negotiated 
their shared response in the joint condition, the displayed joint accuracy was higher compared 
to the accuracy of the to-be-shared trials for novices but not for experts (Minson et al., 2011). 
Moreover, novices, but not experts, showed a mapping accuracy in the post-interaction 
condition that was similar to the pre-interaction one. Therefore, in the long run, novices 
obtained a minimal benefit from interacting with an expert in the current setting. Overall, the 
type of dyad (i.e., Maths-Maths, Humanities-Maths, Humanities-Humanities) did not 
influence performance across the different conditions of the number line task.  
In the joint condition, each member of the dyad saw their respective estimates from 
the to-be-shared condition and was asked to move a third slider to agree upon a joint 
estimate. Ninety-eight percent of joint estimates fell within the interval that was created by 
QRYLFHV¶DQGH[SHUWV¶HVWLPDWHVLQWKHWR-be-shared condition, thereby indicating that in the 
joint condition, participants averaged their prior responses (Bang et al., 2017; Mahmoodi et 
al., 2015). According to the bracketing principle, averaging nearly all the time would have 
been the most effective strategy if the interval created by individual estimates had nearly 
always included the target number (Jacobson et al., 2011; Larrick & Soll, 2006; Minson et al., 
2011). However, this was clearly not the case in the current experiment, with the correct 
location of the target number falling outside WKHG\DG¶VHVWLPDWHVRQ 60% of occasions. 
Participants failed to conceive a scenario in which both their estimates were either under or 
over the target number position (i.e., an under- or over-estimation pattern). This result 
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highlights the importance of advising interacting people that both novices and experts can be 
biased in the same direction; in which case, they should completely reconsider their opinions.  
The two members of each dyad assigned an equal weight to their estimates (i.e., 
averaged their estimates) despite their different levels of competence, thereby showing a clear 
equality bias (Mahmoodi et al., 2015). Both experts and novices were responsible for the 
heavy reliance on averaging. In fact, neither experts nor novices attempted to pull their joint 
estimate towards their individual estimate in the to-be-shared condition; instead, both dyad 
members sought the average. The presence of a strong equality bias is in line with previous 
studies, which have shown that the assignment of equal weight to judgments emerges even 
when the difference in performance is large, when trial-by-trial feedback about the true 
answer is provided, when cumulative feedback about the performance of each observer is 
provided and when participants have monetary incentives to deviate from equal weighting 
(Bang et al., 2017; Mahmoodi et al., 2015). The strong reliance on averaging may be 
explained by WKHQRYLFH¶Vdesire to participate in the joint condition DQGWKHH[SHUW¶Vimplicit 
obligation to integrate the QRYLFH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQ (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Mahmoodi et al., 
2015) or by the fact that participants failed to identify the expert in the dyad (Miner, 1984; 
Trotman et al., 1983), even though the latter does not seem to be the case in the present study. 
Therefore, in the case of peer interaction, as often happens in learning contexts, the expert 
should be clearly identified and rendered responsible for leading the novice toward a better 
accomplishment of the assigned task.  
3HRSOHW\SLFDOO\GLVFRXQWRWKHUV¶RSLQLRQHJRFHQWULFGLVFRXQWLQJDEHKDYLRXUZKLFK
paradoxically, is strongest aPRQJSHRSOHRIORZFRPSHWHQFHZKRUHDOO\VKRXOGWDNHRWKHUV¶
advice (i.e., Dunning-Kruger effect) (Dunning, 2011; Kruger & Dunning, 1999). One 
difference between paradigms investigating egocentric discounting and the current one is that 
they did not involve interaction, and, as such, there was no social obligation to take the 
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RWKHU¶VRSLQLRQLQWR account. Another difference is that studies on advice-taking typically 
IRFXVRQVLWXDWLRQVZKHUHLWZRXOGEHLQSDUWLFLSDQWV¶EHVWLQWHUHVWWRWDNHWKHRWKHUV¶DGYLFH
into account. The current study stands out in at least two ways. First, we study advice-taking 
in a more natural setting where social dynamics are more likely to come into play. Second, 
we study both sides of the interaction: the perspectives of the less competent individual who 
has something to gain and the more competent individual who has something to lose. These 
features of our study together with our findings allow us to refine the idea that people 
W\SLFDOO\GLVFRXQWRWKHUV¶RSLQLRQ:KLOHWKHREVHUYHGµHTXDO¶-weighting strategy implies that 
the less competent dyad member did not give a sufficiently high weight to their more 
competent partner (classic egocentric discounting), it also implies that the more competent 
dyad member did not give a sufficiently low weight to their less competent partner (a 
phenomenon which perhaps should be calleGµDOORFHQWULF¶GLVFRXQWLQJ 
In our study, performance in the joint condition tended to equal performance of the 
best estimator in the dyad (Bahrami et al., 2012b); hence the beneficial effect of interaction 
was generally limited. Nevertheless, the interaction benefit was not uniform but better 
explained by the statistical interaction between the similarity in performance of the two dyad 
members and the average accuracy of dyad members in the to-be-shared condition. In line 
with previous studies (Bahrami et al., 2013), interaction led to a benefit when the two dyad 
members exhibited a similar level of accuracy in the to-be-shared condition. In an exploratory 
analysis, we found that this relationship was evident when the averaged performance of the 
two dyad members in the to-be-shared condition was above the mean and progressively 
disappeared with lower average performance. Interaction was beneficial when the dyad 
members had similar levels of expertise and when, on their own, they were sufficiently 
accurate. Therefore, an optimal arrangement of working dyads should take into consideration 
both their similarity and their level of ability. In fact, two individuals with the same but low 
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level of expertise appeared to represent the least effective means of achieving an interaction 
benefit.   
After performing the conditions of the number line task, participants estimated their 
and their partner¶V ability in the number line task by completing a competence scale. Overall, 
participants displayed an accurate categorisation of themselves and their partner as the expert 
or the novice in the dyad. Nevertheless, novices overestimated their actual competence and 
considered themselves as only slightly worse than their partner. Experts, instead, were 
humble and underestimated their performance in comparison with their novice partner.    
In summary, the present study demonstrated that, after interacting with an expert in a 
numerical estimation task, novices showed minimal benefit from the interaction. This result 
occurred at least when feedback and the explicit identification of the expert dyad member 
were absent, as was the case in the current study. Despite declaring different levels of 
expertise, interacting individuals assigned an equal weight to their estimates, thereby showing 
a clear equality bias (Mahmoodi et al., 2015). Finally, we demonstrated that for the 
interaction benefit to emerge, dyad members must have similar levels of expertise and 
sufficiently accurate average performance. Taken together, our findings provide important 
information for dyads interacting within learning and organisational contexts. We suggest 
that experts should lead the interaction and convince the novices to follow their experienced 
guidance. Moreover, the dyad should be assembled so that the two interacting individuals 
have similar levels of expertise and that their average performance is sufficiently accurate. In 
particular, we suggest that individuals with similar but low average performance should not 
be paired during interaction given the resultant lack of an interaction benefit.  
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